How to Write Research Papers, or Don’t make your readers SCREAM!

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Are you guilty of this?

“program testing can show the presence of bugs but never their absence”

“safety-critical systems blah blah formal verification”
- Do you have a three page introduction?
- Do you give four pages of background theory?
- Do you include a whole page about future work?
- Did you copy-paste your abstract, introduction and conclusions?
Why???

Maybe you were imitating the style of other papers?

Perhaps your research supervisor has been using the same clichés for 20 years?

Trying to sound “academic”?

Scientific writing is communication! — of your results!
What people want to know

- **What** did you do?
- **Why** did you do it?
- What **techniques** did you borrow?
- How **precisely** did you do it?
- What was the **outcome**?
- What did you **discover**?
Title and abstract

- Your *title* compresses your work down to a few words.
  It needs to be snappy and clear!

[Readers scan lists of titles in a conference / journal.]

- Your *abstract* compresses your entire *paper* down to a paragraph.
Main body of paper

- **Introduction** of the work, including *brief* literature references as motivation
- **Background**: your starting point; the *minimum* material necessary to read your paper
- Then **Your methods • Your data • Your analysis**
- **Discussion** of your results, compared with related work
- **Brief Conclusions** to summarise your **findings**
A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems

R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman
MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and Department of Mathematics

An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding decryption key. This has two important consequences:
(1) Couriers or other secure means are not needed to transmit keys, since a message can be enciphered using an encryption key publicly revealed by the intended recipient. Only he can decipher the message, since only he knows the corresponding decryption key.
(2) A message can be “signed” using a privately held decryption key. Anyone can verify this signature using the corresponding publicly revealed encryption key. Signatures cannot be forged, and a signer cannot later deny the validity of his signature. This has obvious applications in “electronic mail” and “electronic funds transfer” systems. A message is encrypted by representing it as a number M, raising M to a publicly specified power e, and then taking the remainder when the result is divided by the publicly specified product, n, of two large secret prime numbers p and q. Decryption is similar; only a different, secret, power d is used, where \( d = e^{-1} \mod (p-1)*(q-1) \). The security of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the published divisor, n.

Maths should not be typeset as code!

\( E = mc^2 \) not \( E = m \times c^2 \)
We have proposed a method for implementing a public-key cryptosystem whose security rests in part on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. If the security of our method proves to be adequate, it permits secure communications to be established without the use of couriers to carry keys, and it also permits one to “sign” digitized documents.

The security of this system needs to be examined in more detail. In particular, the difficulty of factoring large numbers should be examined very closely. The reader is urged to find a way to “break” the system. Once the method has withstood all attacks for a sufficient length of time it may be used with a reasonable amount of confidence.

Our encryption function is the only candidate for a “trap-door one-way permutation” known to the authors. It might be desirable to find other examples, to provide alternative implementations should the security of our system turn out someday to be inadequate. There are surely also many new applications to be discovered for these functions.
A striking title that makes a point

A family of unimplemented computing languages is described that is intended to span differences of application area by a unified framework. This framework dictates the rules about the uses of user-coined names, and the conventions about characterizing functional relationships. Within this framework the design of a specific language splits into two independent parts. One is the choice of written appearances of programs (or more generally, their physical representation). The other is the choice of the abstract entities (such as numbers, character-strings, lists of them, functional relations among them) that can be referred to in the language.

The system is biased towards “expressions” rather than “statements.” It includes a nonprocedural (purely functional) subsystem that aims to expand the class of users’ needs that can be met by a single print-instruction, without sacrificing the important properties that make conventional right-hand-side expressions easy to construct and understand.
11. Conclusion

The languages people use to communicate with computers differ in their intended aptitudes, towards either a particular application area, or a particular phase of computer use (high level programming, program assembly, job scheduling, etc). They also differ in physical appearance, and more important, in logical structure. The question arises, do the idiosyncrasies reflect basic logical properties of the situations that are being catered for? Or are they accidents of history and personal background that may be obscuring fruitful developments? This question is clearly important if we are trying to predict or influence language evolution.

To answer it we must think in terms, not of languages, but of families of languages. That is to say we must systematize their design so that a new language is a point chosen from a well-mapped space, rather than a laboriously devised construction.

To this end the above paper has marshalled three techniques of language design: abstract syntax, axiomatization, and an underlying abstract machine.

It is assumed that future calls on language development cannot be forstalled without generalizing the alternatives to explicit sequencing. The innovations of “program-points” and the “off-side rule” are directed at two of the problems (respectively in the areas of semantics and syntax) that must consequently be faced.
Theorems for free!

Philip Wadler

You can get away with a cutesy title if you are a known genius presenting at a high-profile event. Not otherwise.

From the type of a polymorphic function we can derive a theorem that it satisfies. Every function of the same type satisfies the same theorem. This provides a free source of useful theorems, courtesy of Reynolds’ abstraction theorem for the polymorphic lambda calculus.

Admirably concise, but no mention of the key contribution: parametricity.
No conclusions, it just ends

The restriction to strict arrows is not to be taken lightly. For instance, given a function $r$ of type

$$r : \forall A. A^* \to A^*$$

parametricity implies that

$$r_{A'} \circ a^* = a^* \circ r_A$$

for all functions $a : A \to A'$. If the fixpoint combinator appears in the definition of $r$, then we can only conclude that the above holds for strict $a$, which is a significant restriction.

The desire to derive theorems from types therefore suggests that it would be valuable to explore programming languages that prohibit recursion, or allow only its restricted use. In theory, this is well understood; we have already noted that any computable function that is provably total in second-order Peano arithmetic can be defined in the pure polymorphic lambda calculus, without using the fixpoint as a primitive. However, practical languages based on this notion remain terra incognita.
**Chicken 1** Chicken chicken chicken. Chicken chicken, chicken chicken (chicken chicken chicken) chicken chicken-chicken.
Table II: Epar, Vampire, and Z3 re-proving with 900 s and Paradox with 30 s (14 185 problems)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATP</th>
<th>Proved</th>
<th>Unique</th>
<th>Countersat.</th>
<th>Greedy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vampire</td>
<td>5641</td>
<td>218</td>
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<td>Epar</td>
<td>5595</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Z3</td>
<td>4375</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradox</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2614</td>
<td>6142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectively</td>
<td>6142</td>
<td>2614</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See “Publication quality tables in LATEX” by Simon Fear

Briefly: no vertical rules; no double rules; use the booktabs package
PA was proved decidable in [17] whose algorithm was improved in [5]. In [12] this procedure was implemented in HOL Light. The general issue of reflection in LCF-like theorem provers is studied in [10].


Refer to people by name, not by reference number! Those numbers aren’t words.

Be careful with the passive voice! Things are not simply done; people do them.
The problem with “I” is that it makes the paper about *yourself* rather than about *your work*.

Switching to “we” simply turns you into a megalomaniac with delusions of royalty.

“We” can refer to “you and I”, but otherwise keep the focus on objective findings.
Summary

- The traditional paper structure helps readers *navigate*. [They may have to read many papers quickly.]

- Watch for boilerplate such as "outline of the paper", "future work" and long lists of definitions. Don’t try to sound “academic”!

- If you want to be *recognised*, you need to be *understood*!